HSM Cryptographic Key Sharding Enclave
Sold once. One buyer acquires the complete IP outright — every line of source, every test, every audit artefact — and it is then denied to every other party. No licence, no recurring, no second buyer.
Acquire — begin due diligence →Technical Ledger
| SKU | VLA-GEN-HSM-V1.0 |
|---|---|
| Vendor | Vlaander LTD |
| Classification | Engineering Asset |
| Variant | Default Title |
| Availability | ProvisionedPASSING |
Provenance & integrity.
| Language | C++20 |
|---|---|
| Build | GCC 13 + Clang 18 · -Werror |
| Constant-time | dudect + ctgrind verifiedPASSING |
| Sanitizers | ASan · UBSan (both compilers)PASSING |
| Fuzzing | 5 libFuzzer targetsPASSING |
| Binary hardening | CET · RELRO · NX · PIE · FORTIFY=3PASSING |
| Tests | ~90 adversarial · green on GCC 13 + Clang 18PASSING |
| Signing scheme | ed25519 signed releases |
| Signing key | Publishing 2026-Q3 |
| SHA-256 | Publishing 2026-Q3 |
| Release | Publishing 2026-Q3 |
| External audit | Publishing 2026-Q3 |
Value, in your metrics.
| Metric you track | Magnitude |
|---|---|
| Key-compromise blast radius | One leaked enclave is not a key compromise — a usable key never exists in any address space. |
| Custodial insurance posture | No single node or person holds a signable key, removing the single-point-of-compromise insurers price against. |
| Nonce-reuse catastrophic-failure risk | Structurally eliminated by a single-use nonce vault with a crash-safe write-ahead log — no reuse across a restart. |
| Audit surface | ~3,600 lines of core C++; every security property has an adversarial test that attacks it. |
Build-vs-buy basis.
Reproducing this in-house: approximately 18–30 engineer-months for a senior team familiar with applied threshold cryptography (FROST/GG18 MPC), constant-time engineering, and TEE attestation. At a loaded cost of $25,000 per engineer-month, that is $450,000–$750,000, or $1,050,000 after a 40% risk premium for scope overrun. Purchasing the source: $550,000 plus approximately 8 weeks of integration effort. Stated biases: we compare against the high end of the build estimate, apply a 40% risk premium for scope overrun, and exclude opportunity cost. Editable assumptions: engineer-months (18–30), loaded cost per month ($25,000), risk premium (40%). Flip any of these and the comparison adjusts accordingly — the model is yours to defend, not ours to dictate.
Risk allocation.
| Risk | Borne by | Basis | Buyer’s recourse |
|---|---|---|---|
| IP cleanliness | Vlaander LTD | Source warranted as original work, clean of third-party IP at point of sale. | Indemnification capped at the purchase price paid. |
| Benchmark performance | Vlaander LTD | Published numbers must reproduce on the documented hardware. 30-day inspection window from delivery. | Refund of the purchase price within the inspection window. |
| Integration into buyer’s stack | Buyer | Integration footprint published on every product page. No warranty extends to bespoke environments outside the documented targets. | Use the published footprint as the integration spec; engage Vlaander engineering at sales@vlaander.com for paid support. |
| Regulatory compliance in buyer’s jurisdiction | Buyer | Export classified EAR99. Buyer self-screens against restricted jurisdictions and parties under their own legal counsel. | Request a pre-sale export review at sales@vlaander.com — provided at no charge. |
| Vendor continuity | Buyer | No vendor can warrant its own continuation. Source delivered without licence server, kill-switch, or expiry — risk transferred to buyer by the outright-sale model. | Self-maintain in perpetuity using the delivered source; fork freely under the Sale terms. |
| Source-code escrow | Joint | Source is delivered to the buyer at sale, so escrow is structurally unnecessary. Available on request when buyer counsel mandates a third-party deposit. | Request escrow at sales@vlaander.com — buyer-funded; Vlaander participates without charge. |
| Security disclosure post-sale | Joint | Vlaander acknowledges security reports within 24 hours and honours coordinated disclosure indefinitely on shipped versions. Buyer applies remediation in their environment. | Report to sales@vlaander.com — disclosure policy published at /security. |
Scope & maturity.
- FROST (Ed25519) threshold signing, no-dealer DKG, proactive secret sharing, nonce vault, and identifiable abort.
- The six-gate assurance toolchain: dudect, ctgrind, libFuzzer ×5, cppcheck, ASan/UBSan, ELF hardening.
- Attestation-verification logic, the attested transport, and measurement-bound sealing.
- The SEV-SNP attestation-report ABI, parser, and genuine ECDSA-P384 verification path.
- Threshold ECDSA (secp256k1) is semi-honest GG18 — a correctness milestone, not yet malicious-secure.
- Attestation root of trust is a software key, not silicon; the SEV-SNP provider and KDS chain are labeled seams.
- ECDSA keygen uses a trusted dealer; the no-dealer DKG exists for FROST, not yet for secp256k1.
- SEV-SNP production silicon and the AMD KDS → pinned-ARK chain.
- CGGMP21 malicious-security ZK layer and a constant-time libsecp256k1 backend.
- External cryptographic audit, FIPS 140-3 / Common Criteria, HSM-rooted backup ceremony, CI enablement.
System Abstract
A hardened, constant-time C++20 threshold-signing system. Its defining property: the complete private key is born split across n nodes and is never reconstructed — not at generation, not at signing, not at backup. Any quorum of t nodes jointly produces a standard, externally-verifiable signature (Ed25519 or ECDSA/secp256k1) without the whole key ever existing in any address space.
The security thesis is single-failure containment. A trusted-execution break is treated as realistic, not impossible — and because no node holds a usable key, one compromised node, even a leaked enclave, is not a key compromise. Signing is gated by hardware attestation woven into the protocol itself: every message is cryptographically bound to a fresh, attested session key, so a non-attested node cannot participate in a signing round.
Delivered as source: ~3,600 lines of core C++, ~90 adversarial tests green on two compilers, and an assurance toolchain — independent constant-time verifiers, fuzzing, sanitizers, and binary hardening — held to a bar above commercial norms. Every security property ships with a test that attacks it.